We must look at the Comintern as the origin of the Communist Party, both as a concept and a category. This is neither an arbitrary choice, nor does it mean neglecting the party organisation of the working class, which had been going on for decades. The 1917 October Revolution created one of the most important historical achievements: the Communist Party. Identifying the beginning of the Communist Party with the Comintern is an homage to the October Revolution, but it is not only that.

The Communist League, of which Marx and Engels wrote the programme in 1848, was not an ambitious form that had been theoretically pre-designed as an instrument for the working class’s struggle to seize political power. In an era where the working class had been  becoming more prominent and the crisis was about to erupt, the democratic and communist struggle was leaning towards the working class. Democratic and communist motives were inevitably intertwined.

Democratization was conceptualized mainly by the praxis of the French Revolution and the perspective brought about by this praxis. Overthrow of the Ancien Régime, politization of the popular working-class movement adjacent to enlightenment, creation of participation mechanisms… All of these meant concrete constitutional changes, political structures based on universal suffrage and ultimately demolishment of institutionalized dominance of the church. The trajectory drawn by these developments would only yield results that would be unacceptable for the capitalist exploitation. However, the working class, whose share in the population had been significantly increasing as a result of the developing industry, could have only been recognized as a leading force of the class struggle with the aim of seizing the political power and had been added to the political programme at a much closer moment. The revolution would unfold as the working classes swiftly approached and ultimately transcended the limits of the bourgeois horizon.

This approach also shaped the form of organisation. The Communist League was a relatively loose and informal entity compared to the "revolutionary organisations" that had already demonstrated their effectiveness even in bourgeois revolutions. Its international qualities offered the potential to move beyond the bourgeois revolution, which built the working class's struggle and the revolutionary process on the national markets and nation-states, thereby dividing workers along national lines. However, the objective conditions on which the organisation was based were far from uniform. The industrial revolution in England was still unparalleled in its intensity and impact. In France, where revolutionary fervour had persisted for decades and remained unquenched, the country was predominantly agrarian rather than industrial, with the peasantry representing the most significant social force. Across Europe, including the German-speaking regions, political struggles were centred on establishing constitutional forms of government, accompanied by movements that positioned themselves against empires influenced by the rising tide of nationalism. The Communist League's international perspective and structure, while ambitious, created challenges in maintaining a clear and unified focus.

Moreover, the intervention of Marx and Engels in the organisation coincided almost exactly with the outbreak of the revolution, leaving the Communist League immersed in the struggle without the possibility of providing centralized leadership or even coordination. Efforts to establish a publishing line that pushed democratic demands toward communism, the communists' frontline participation in peasant uprisings, and their attempts to steer the workers' movement all unfolded simultaneously. The 1848 uprising would be followed by intense oppression in a couple of years. Born amid a continent-wide crisis and upheaval, the Communist League represented the first experiment in communist struggle and organisation. However, it offered no clear model to follow. Communists responded to immediate practical necessities, striving to shape the transition from the democratic bourgeois revolution to working-class organisation.

The social-democratic parties that emerged in the next stage took shape under the specific conditions of Germany. In the interim between these two periods, the International Workingmen’s Association—later recorded in history as the First International in the interim between these two periods—was founded in 1864 and could only endure until the aftermath of the 1871 Paris Commune with a split. The First International is not worthy of a separate consideration in terms of the process of forming the Communist Party.

The First International served as the stage on which the workers' movement re-emerged after the reactionary period that followed the 1848 revolutions. However, this stage was rife with debates among a complex array of factions—most notably Marxists and anarchists, though not exclusively so. In fact, these very debates are what make the experience so valuable. The anarchist faction's refusal to engage in the pursuit of political power sharpened the communists’ resolve to seize power through revolution—a stance they reinforced both through theoretical arguments and practical organisational proposals. Beyond this polarization, the International also absorbed various dynamics inherited from bourgeois democratic revolutionary movements.

Not only were there ideological and political differences, but the organisational structure itself was diverse. It was a formation that included parties, individuals, groups, and trade unions as members. In terms of structure, ideology, and program, the First International was far  removed from the homogeneous concept of a “party” as understood not only by communists but also by the bourgeoisie in the 20th century.

The dissolution in 1876 was influenced not only by the reactionary period that followed the Paris Commune, but also by the internal differences that proved unsustainable. Although the Second International, established in 1889, also benefited from this diversity, it nevertheless evolved into a coherent organisational model.

As in earlier experiences, this diversity arose from the imperative to consolidate the various strands of the workers' movement. Since none of these strands had a proven record of success capable of paving the way for one to dominate class politics, such diversity was inevitable.

Yet we know that an organisation oriented toward “managing the revolution” is fundamentally different from a platform designed to meet the requirement of an “umbrella organisation”. The Second International never reverted to the model of its predecessor.

From its very inception, social democracy aimed to unite a fragmented field under a common banner, necessitating a flexible and loosely structured approach. In countries where social democracy gained strength, it coalesced into a unified body composed of mass trade unions and popular political parties—a form of unity that proved highly effective in several nations.

There is a strong connection between the inherent characteristics of this structure and the party’s focus on electoral politics. Social-democratic parties, as a model, assumed the framework of parliamentary bourgeois democracy.

Undoubtedly, the most influential example was the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany, which—alongside Marx and Engels and led by Karl Kautsky, one of the leading Marxist theorists and politicians of the era—emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as the powerhouse of the international workers' movement that defined the Second International.

In Germany, it was not industrialization that lagged, but rather the formation of a centralized nation-state. The Holy Roman Empire, with its feudal fragmentation of authority, had carried this division into the 19th century. Although this structure viewed the social gains of the 1789 Revolution as a burden, it ultimately could not withstand the modernizing and centralizing forces of the French Empire, succumbing to the Napoleonic Wars. This process, which strengthened the ideal of German unification, was driven by the progress of capitalism in German lands. Amid competition between various regional capitals, Prussia—centered in Berlin—gradually emerged as the dominant force.

The unification of Germany in 1871 marked the beginning of a period of significant economic growth. In Germany, capitalism’s social and political victory was not achieved through a popular movement from below, but through a state-led integration from above. In keeping with this trajectory, the German bourgeoisie initially took decisive action against the workers' movement. Unlike the bourgeois revolution in other parts of Europe, which was marked by uprisings from the masses, the German revolution culminated not in a popular struggle but in the consolidation of state power; it was not the workers pushing for republican representation, but a unifying emperor’s coronation that marked the turning point. The political reactionism of this top-down process was so stark that, in 1878, the Reichstag passed the "Anti-Socialist Law," directly targeting the Social Democrats—the communists of the time. This law would remain in effect, with several extensions, until 1889.

Apart from the pressures that kept the organisation of Communists outside the law for a time, the Party was formed in 1875 mainly through the merger of two organisations. The Lasallean German General Workers' Association, established in 1863, and the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany, founded by the Marxists in 1869, merged in 1875 to form the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany. The experience that would provide an organisational model for the international communist movement for decades was a merger project. Naturally, the Social-Democratic movement presumed the unity of movements and cadres from different ideological traditions. This is fundamentally different from the Communist Parties of 1919, which declared that they would search for crystallisation and homogeneity. The division of Social-Democracy into various factions is inherent by definition and is an innate characteristic.

The transformation of Germany into an imperial state, with its national-state character, greatly accelerated the development of the bourgeoisie and the country’s capitalist growth. In a short time, the German Empire would represent the heart of the continent, economically competing with England, politically competing with France and Russia.

The development of capitalism was accompanied by the growth and expansion of the working class, rapidly becoming the core class of society. Against this dynamism, the limits of  pressure mechanisms were clear. Indeed, the Social-Democratic Party and trade unions evolved into a mass movement by rendering legal restrictions obsolete. This mass movement, which directed Germany toward the “early welfare state” at the end of the 19th century, also paved the way for the “early” social state. Particularly, the trade unions not only acted as the subject of demands and struggles but also played a role in institutionalizing workers' rights as implementers of the achievements within the system.

While Social-Democratic mass trade unions brought the struggle for rights to institutional victories, they also drew support from the pressure exerted by the Party through votes over the system. Bernstein's revisionism, which argued that capitalism could radically change without the seizure of state power and the dismantling of the state apparatus, was based on a “partial social gains” foundation. If the bourgeoisie were to consent to a mild power transition, the labour gains accumulated by Social-Democracy could have easily led Europe to socialism.

Yet not only was the thesis of a peaceful transition invalid; it was not just revisionism, but the party leadership itself that was sliding into conformism, clinging to the gains secured by social democracy within the bourgeois system, and accepting a more backward position so as not to endanger those gains.

When Engels wrote the preface for the new edition of Marx’s “Class Struggles in France” in 1895, initiating a debate on how the changes in capitalism affected the revolutionary process, the flagship of Social-Democracy, the German Party, was indeed heavily inclined toward conformism. Engels was aware that the social situation and the structure of the state promised a future very different from the past revolutionary conditions symbolized by the barricades. The objective situation had radically changed, as evidenced by the example of capitals now equipped with boulevards that made barricades unfeasible. Engels’ intervention, centred around the search for revolution, would be censored by the Party’s centre. Reformist deviation had taken root enough to challenge the living representative of Marxism.

Social-Democracy had entered a process of becoming an intra-systemic current. Engels’ foresight before his death was that the Social-Democratic Party would have to wait until 1912 to win elections. However, becoming the first party by gaining the highest vote did not mean taking power. The working class could only come to power through a revolutionary upheaval. The rise of German Social-Democracy to become the largest party did not mean it was capable of revolution. The historical trajectory of the Party at the start of the 20th century became one of capitulation to the system.

The election performance of the major parties of the Second International was indeed striking. The Austrian Social Democratic Party surpassed 23% in 1901 to reach its highest vote share [1]. The Belgian Labour Party fluctuated between 15% and 27% between 1894 and 1908, dropping below 7% in 1910, then climbing above 30% by 1914. The French Party had more than 16% in 1914, just before the war [2]. The Italian Socialist Party also reached over 20% in 1904 before regressing, but still held a significant position. The Norwegian Labour Party showed steady growth in the early 20th century, surpassing 20% in 1909 and 26% in 1912. The Dutch Social Democratic Workers' Party had 18.5% in 1913, and the Danish Social Democrats approached 30%. The Social Democratic Party of Finland vote fluctuated around 40% before the war. The Social Democratic Party of Switzerland reached 20% in 1911. Swedish Social Democrats, in alliance with Liberals, surpassed 30% just before the war. The French party of the International reached above 13% in 1910 and 17% in 1914. These high vote shares can be interpreted as Social Democracy being drawn into the system. However, another perspective might conclude that there was a substantial potential for the class behind these figures.

Between the mid-1890s and the mid-1910s, a period of nearly twenty years, it was possible to intervene in the direction of Social Democracy. Its failure to intervene, coupled with the catalytic effect of the First World War, could be seen as an indirect confirmation of Lenin’s theory of organisation of the working class. The role of the “organized subject” in class struggle was far greater than anticipated, and in Western Europe, Marxist revolutionaries had handed their will over to the “masses.”

The masses, including the working class, could not be the subject of socialist revolution. Mass organisations like trade unions were the terrain of class struggle for the party. In fact, Social- Democracy had long ceased to be a subject and had turned into the field of struggle between opposing classes. The distance between the revisionist right, which meant the survival of capitalism with the support of the working class, and those who continued the search for revolution, could not be defined within the usual tendencies of a workers’ party. The centre of the German Party and the Second International viewed the issue this way, attempting to manage contradictions. However, class struggle had resurfaced within the Party itself. Revolutionaries were doomed to remain weak in this contradiction. Being on the left or revolutionary wing of the Party did not mean being the organized subject; on the contrary, such an effort only tied their hands.

The figure who defined the situation in this way came from Russia, where the working class could neither gather in mass open organisations nor institutionalize its gains, and where the Party had to retreat to a safe distance from state institutions to protect itself.

The Bolshevik experience and the Communist Party are not identical. Although they carried deep differences from Western Europe, the Bolsheviks were still a faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, which initially drew inspiration from the Western European socialist model. The existence of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and other groups, the lack of political homogeneity in the Party, and the continuation of different organisational practices and publications, all demonstrate the difficulty in finding a direct correspondence with Lenin’s theory of organisation and leadership.

However, we can find a number of common formal features. The Bolshevik organisation, though separate from Social Democracy, was a centralist and disciplined revolutionary organisation. This organisation, although engaging in legal activities, was designed as a structure that could not fit within the system’s rules, meaning illegality was essential. For Communist parties, bourgeois legality was not a shared principle but an opportunity to be exploited.

The Leninist organisation “model” is often understood through these formal characteristics: Ideological and political homogeneity must be achieved. Centralism, which is “democratic” in the sense that committees are formed through congressional mechanisms, was the fundamental rule of functioning. Absolute discipline should be implemented in practice. Revolutionizing the system was the necessary condition for illegal activity. However, even after the Bolshevik organisation became an independent party, it was still not homogeneous; during the February-October period of 1917, the central leadership of the revolutionary party faced numerous disagreements on critical issues. These disagreements included whether to support the Provisional Government for the progress of the bourgeois revolution or whether to withdraw support to prepare the working class for revolution, whether to organize an uprising or oppose it so that the organisation is not disclosed in the legal press. After the revolution, Lenin's party, the Bolshevik Party, would take steps to end factionalism by taking a decision  at the Congress. In the following years, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, however, had been a party that incorporated various ideological currents, whether openly or implicitly. Looking at the history of Communist parties, the concepts of homogeneity, centralism, discipline, and legality have varied from country to country and from one period to another. Thus, it is necessary to look beyond formal features.

If we could be satisfied with formal characteristics alone, we could have an organisational model. In the Second International, we might talk about a model of looseness. But looseness could never have a theory. Social Democracy neglected theory when it came to organisation.

In the Bolsheviks, however, the importance placed on organisation goes beyond a model and leads to the theory of leadership.

Contrary to what is often believed, Lenin’s What Is to Be Done? is a work that goes beyond practical struggles; in fact, it is one of the most theory-heavy books by its author. What Is to Be Done? presents a theory of leadership that critiques the organisational form of Social- Democracy.

According to this theory, the primary goal of the working class's organized struggle is the seizure of political power. Revolution cannot emerge from the dynamics of the class itself. The seizure of power must be planned and executed as an action. The organisation that must be brought to life in this process goes far beyond a collective of workers who spend their days in factories, demand their rights, and act in solidarity. The Party must be an organisation of professional revolutionaries.

The pursuit of revolution is the defining factor behind the formal characteristics of the Communist Party. Centralism, illegality, and cell-based organisation are not independent variables, but rather dependent ones.

The participation of the working class and the working masses in class struggle is not an inherent condition. Because the masses live off their labour, they do not automatically develop immunity to bourgeois ideology, politics, or organisations. The masses, including their trade-union type organisations, are part of the "field of class struggle." Communists engage in a continuous battle against the bourgeois ideologies and politics that constantly reproduce themselves within the working class. This is a dimension of the broader class struggle.

The bourgeois influence within the class manifests itself in various forms, such as  economism, trade-unionism, and others. The question of how much of the Marxist discussions stay within legitimate, acceptable boundaries within the party, and where the oppositional positions of enemy classes begin, does not have an absolute answer. Class struggle is ongoing within the class itself.

Building a centre that cannot be infiltrated by the ongoing class struggle is a fundamental condition for revolutionary action. Furthermore, carrying class consciousness is not a matter of choice, but an absolute necessity for this reason.

The heightened importance of leadership, compared to its previous understanding, lies within these observations and theses. A class that has not organized its vanguard or developed revolutionary consciousness may, in the final analysis, see its actions come to reflect those of the opposing class.

Lenin's discussion is undoubtedly connected to how the organisation should take shape. However, it is also a theoretical contribution that incorporates the concept of "uneven development." The fact that the working-class masses are unable to directly organize the act of seizing power creates a gap that addresses the class's internal unevenness—a gap that will be filled by the professional revolutionary organisation that represents the most advanced section of the class.

The working-class party manages objective unevenness. In Russia, capitalism is relatively underdeveloped, the working class is relatively inexperienced, and the social weight lies with the peasantry. The process of socialist revolution is not necessarily deferred until such uneven facts are resolved in the distant future. Weaknesses in class dynamics can be compensated for by other sources. The worker-peasant alliance, the land reform policy for landless peasants to be adopted during the revolutionary conjuncture, and the alliance between the working class and oppressed nations subjugated by the Tsar are all expansions of the revolutionary vanguard. To conceptualize and implement these strategies, the Party must be fundamentally driven by an organisation of professional revolutionaries.

We have previously discussed the formal aspects of centralism. In Communist Parties, centralism is often examined through the lens of democratic participation, control mechanisms, the weight of the center, member rights, and bureaucratization. These issues can certainly be debated in relation to practical realities. However, centralism also has another dimension that concerns the very character of the working class.

The working class underwent a long process of formation during the era of the industrial revolution within the capitalist production system. The scale of workshops and factories in capitalism is unique, particularly in terms of the workforce it brings together. The impact of thousands, even tens of thousands, of workers working side by side in the same space, and the emergence of diverse types of labor that complement each other, has been crucial in shaping class identity. People working in large groups did not only share their social lives within the same neighbourhoods but also suffered together and celebrated together. This broadly shared experience inevitably led to the growth of collective organisation and struggle. Economic struggle, or the fight for rights, became an inseparable element of the working class’s condition. This aspect has been clearly identified in classical Marxist analyses.

The critical issue in this discussion is how the working-class transitions from mere awareness, organisation, and struggle into a state of self-consciousness and political organisation. A historical example of this is the English working class, which, despite having experienced the industrial revolution in its most advanced form and developed a shared culture and way of life, failed to establish a strong and revolutionary political presence. In France, which once served as the epicentre of the workers' movement, no industrial revolution comparable to England’s ever occurred. In Germany, as class formation opened up to mass organisation, the working class entered a process where it became a part of the existing system rather than changing it. This situation presents a major challenge. The solution to this issue can begin with the recognition that politics is not simply a reflection of the economic sphere.

However, this problem has undergone a further transformation over time. The collective and massive participation of workers in the production process showed certain fluctuations, but with the transformation in the model of capital accumulation which is effective on in labor processes since the 1980s, it was ultimately abandoned. Workplaces, once common spaces for the working class, were divided into isolated compartments as part of a vast global project.

The work environment no longer facilitates dialogue among workers, nor is it possible for them to share their social lives. Capitalist restructuring has aimed to atomize the working class, and significant progress has been made in this regard.

As a result, the economic and social unity of workers no longer holds political or revolutionary significance, and the fragmentation of this unity has become an additional problem.

We know that the broadest definition of the working class is that it is subjected to capitalist exploitation. A large segment of the masses subjected to this exploitation constitutes the class faction that generates surplus value, and this characteristic lends strategic importance to certain sectors. However, none of this fills the gaps necessary for the working class to achieve revolutionary political organisation and consciousness. Moreover, capitalism today has deepened this objective gap into a structural rift.

Drawing from historical lessons of class struggle, the bourgeoisie has succeeded in organizing the economic sphere in a way that ensures the division of the working class rather than its unity. In times when the economic sphere contributed to the development of a class culture, Lenin argued that revolutionary consciousness must be carried by an external professional revolutionary organisation. Today, the role of organized, intentional intervention in uniting a class divided by the economy in politics has only increased.

Unity among workers —who have been fragmented in workplaces and daily life by capitalism

— can only be restored politically. It must also be noted that this transformation has reshaped union structures as well. The new model that has emerged from the criticism of class-based and mass unionism, under the banner of contemporary unionism, shows that unions no longer derive their power from their members' struggles for rights, but instead from their institutional acceptance within the existing system.

Unions that have undergone this transformation have distanced themselves from being true forms of working-class organisation. There are indeed examples where the trade unions of the past managed to preserve their strength to a certain extent. However, the institutional gains of the unions can also result in the degeneration of the communist party or the broader social structure surrounding it. In a non-revolutionary environment, the existence of thousands of professional trade unionists leads to a bureaucratic institutionalism within the workers' movement. In any case, unions must be seen by communists as a site of struggle, not just as tools of it [3].

The need for Leninism in the Communist Party concept is even greater in the 21st century. However, for over thirty years Leninism has been blamed for the defeat of real socialism and the subsequent retreat of communist parties, the workers' movement, and revolutionary dynamics. This attack is not a debate within the left or Marxism; rather, it reflects the influence of bourgeois ideology.

The centralist nature of Communist Parties is the only means by which to make a powerful intervention in reconstructing the working-class culture and labor values that have been undermined. If a disintegrated class is to be reunited politically, the party must be exceedingly strong as the command center of this social operation. In the Communist Party, participation mechanisms should be understood not as formal democratic principles, but as a means to boost this strength and create an environment conducive to the development of cadres who will carry out the defined mission.