In this article, we point out that the processes of decommunization, the prohibition of communist parties, the liquidation of trade unions, and the prohibition of strikes and rallies are closely linked and are a unified policy of the ruling class as part of a strategy to retain power, strengthen and deepen the development of the capitalist system in Central Asia. At the same time, the glorification of the Basmachi, bourgeois nationalists and members of the collaborationist formations who fought on Hitler's side are also the flip side of the coin of this activity of enslaving workers and depriving them of their remaining rights.

 Earlier, we pointed out in our articles that the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet republics of Central Asia took place under the leadership of the first secretaries of the communist parties. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may be exceptions, but even there, the figures who became presidents had a former party and Komsomol background or also relied locally on former heads of party organizations.

As a result, representatives of the leadership of the Communist parties began to dissolve party organizations in the republics after the ban of the CPSU in August 1991, even before the official liquidation of the USSR, completely changing their rhetoric to anti-Soviet and anti-communist.

We must say that this was the result of the prolonged undermining of socialist construction, the systematic violation of the laws of communist doctrine, the weakening of the activities of the soviets, and the creation of shadow capital, which collectively led to the victory of the counterrevolution. And 1991 was only the year of the logical completion of all these processes of internal destruction.

The transformation of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda into the state policy of the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia was a necessary stage for the redistribution of public property and the creation of a capitalist class from among representatives of the party nomenklatura and their relatives, as well as a new breed of entrepreneurs who emerged in the wake of the development of cooperatives, small enterprises and private forms of ownership after the 1989 reform.

This phenomenon requires a separate analysis, taking into account both internal factors and external influences. The sharp reversal in just a few months of 1991 by Nursultan Nazarbayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, as well as Islam Karimov, first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, and Askar Akayev, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, illustrates a rapid and seemingly radical change in ideological position, but behind this speed hides more complex processes.

The rapid condemnation of the "totalitarian past" by these leaders was not spontaneous. On the contrary, it was a carefully planned strategy dictated by several factors. 

Firstly, it is the desire to legitimize the new government against the background of the destruction of the USSR. "Democratic" ideals, opposed to "totalitarianism," seemed to be a necessary tool for gaining the trust of the United States and European countries and attracting Western financial assistance, which was essential for the transition to a market economy. The condemnation of communism became a kind of "purification rite" that allowed them to distance themselves from the past and claim a new political identity.

Secondly, the anti-communist tactics served as a tool for suppressing political opposition. The Communist parties created after 1991 or remaining after the ban of the CPSU, which had significant authority and influence, were under attack. Declaring communism the "source of all ills" made it easier to discredit any opposition forces associated with this past, regardless of their real political programs. It was an effective way to retain power and strengthen the new political regime, built on the principles of authoritarianism, often disguised as a democratic shell.

Thirdly, external factors played a role. Western countries, including the United States, actively supported the process of decommunization in the post-Soviet space. This was reflected in financial assistance, consulting support, and advocacy activities. Western media and think tanks actively shaped the image of communism as a source of evil and unfreedom, thereby supporting similar sentiments within the post-Soviet republics. The impact of this external propaganda cannot be underestimated, especially given the lack of independent publications and the weakness of public organizations and grassroots mass movements in most newly formed states.

Fourthly, the condemnation of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of socialist construction allowed the former party elites to actively begin the process of mass privatization and the dismantling of the planned economy in favor of the interests of the emerging capitalist class.

Thus, at the extraordinary extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in September 1991, Nazarbayev declared that "communist ideology turned into misfortune for millions of Soviet people." "Built on false postulates, it objectively could not win a historical dispute with another system of social development, which has convincingly proved its viability throughout the rest of the globe. It is impossible not to admit that this ideology has discredited itself," he argued. 

It is also important to note that the anti-communist campaign has not always been homogeneous. It was often used to solve internal political problems, sometimes acquiring xenophobic or nationalistic overtones. In some republics, the struggle against the "communist past" also served as a tool to humiliate and suppress the Russian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations, which were often associated with the Soviet government, as well as to foment ethnic conflicts. 

This was also done with the aim of seizing apartments and property of ethnic minorities, who were actually forced to leave for Russia in the early 90s, which allowed the ruling groups, for populist reasons, to redistribute the remaining housing stock in the interests of local residents and migrants from rural areas to release social steam of discontent. 

Plus, all responsibility for the mythical "genocide", repression and "Holodomor" during the collectivization and industrialization of the 1930s was shifted to the Russian communists and their descendants and automatically removed from the national party cadres, who presented themselves as "victims" or perpetrators of Moscow's chauvinistic policy pursued throughout the 70 years of Soviet rule.

The criticism of the Soviet past by the leaders of the post-Soviet states, in particular Emomali Rahmon (Tajikistan), Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) and Askar Akayev (Kyrgyzstan), represents an interesting metamorphosis. Their statements served the purposes of political expediency and the formation of national identity in the post-Soviet reality. That is, the Soviet nations created during the period of socialist construction were declared oppressed, as they were allegedly destroyed and subjected to a policy of assimilation by the leadership of the USSR.

For example, in his interviews with foreign media, Rahmon repeatedly focused on the suppression of national traditions and customs during the Soviet period. He describes the persecution of those who practiced traditional beliefs and rituals, while missing the context of the complex relationship between the Soviet government and local traditions, which were not always unambiguously conflictual. 

Rahmon, speaking about the bans, does not mention the state support of Tajik culture and language during certain periods of Soviet power, for example, through the creation of national theaters, literary magazines and educational institutions in the Tajik language.

Nazarbayev is even more categorical in his assessments of the USSR, calling it a "totalitarian, tightly closed country that ran a subsistence economy. "The same role is played by his statement about "equality in poverty," which is a direct falsification of history that does not reflect the reality of the existence of various strata and living standards in Soviet Kazakhstan.

In general, the statements of former Communist Party leaders are a mixture of simplifications and falsifications in order to legitimize existing regimes, form a new bourgeois national identity, and mobilize around their own throne. The ideological campaign they launched continues even now, which has already been documented in textbooks for schools and universities, at the legislative level through the rehabilitation of all repressed persons, as well as through official condemnation of the Soviet period.

The anti-communist wave that swept the post-Soviet space after the collapse of the USSR turned into a real golgotha for the communist forces. The eradication of communism, declared the "supreme good," led to large-scale persecution, the form and intensity of which varied from republic to republic and changed over time. 

In some cases, it was open repression and harassment, in others it was more subtle pressure aimed at subordinating the Communist parties to the new government and integrating them into a political system beneficial to it. This process, which is complex and multifaceted, deserves a separate detailed analysis for each of the five Central Asian republics.

Consider, for example, Turkmenistan. In the first half of the 1990s, attempts to legally register the organizing committee for the restoration of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan (KPT) invariably failed under various pretexts. This indicates a deliberate policy of the authorities to suppress any manifestations of leftist ideas. The paradox of the situation was that, despite the refusal to register, in 1998 the authorities turned a blind eye to the holding of the founding congress of the KPT. This temporary period of relative freedom of action for the Communists was most likely a tactical maneuver aimed at reducing social tension and creating the illusion of political pluralism. However, this illusion was short-lived.

At the end of 2002, large-scale repressions began, affecting not only the Communists, but also the entire opposition as a whole. Dozens of people were arrested and imprisoned under the pretext of organizing an assassination attempt on President Saparmurat Niyazov, who established a harsh authoritarian regime in the country. Among them was the leader of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, the former head of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of the Turkmen SSR, Serdar Rakhimov. The fate of Rakhimov and many others arrested still remains unknown, which is typical of many such repressions in authoritarian regimes. 

This lack of transparency and information reinforces the sense of impunity and permissiveness on the part of the authorities. To this day, the Communists of Turkmenistan are forced to operate underground, despite the formal end of the one-party regime in 2012 and the registration of a number of other parties. However, these new parties are usually government-controlled and do not represent a real opposition. Attempts to revive the KPT have been consistently suppressed, indicating that the ruling regime retains a deep-rooted fear of socialist ideas.

The situation in Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern. An attempt to register the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1992 was also decisively suppressed. The activists were harassed and had to move to an illegal position. All five officially registered parties in Uzbekistan are loyal to the government and show no signs of opposition activity. They actually serve as a backdrop to simulate the existence of "democracy", hiding under themselves bourgeois regimes that seriously restrict political and trade union activities. This "facade" of multiparty rule is typical for many post-Soviet states, which seek to create the appearance of democracy without changing the authoritarian nature of the regime.

In Kazakhstan, as in other republics, attempts to recreate the Communist Party have faced numerous obstacles. At an extraordinary "liquidation" congress in October 1991, Nazarbayev announced the dissolution of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the creation of a new Socialist Party of Kazakhstan. But one third of the delegates did not agree with this decision, and the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPC), which took place in December 1991, proclaimed the revival of the party and loyalty to Marxist-Leninist ideology. 

However, the registration of the CPC was deliberately delayed, which was a clear manifestation of political pressure from the authorities. It was only in 1994 that the party finally gained official status. This allowed the CPC to take the position of the leading opposition force, which was confirmed by the results of the 1999 parliamentary elections, where it received about 18% of the vote. This success, however, proved short-lived.

The CPC's influence on the political arena of Kazakhstan gradually declined, as it did not have and did not seek to establish links with the labor movement, and its activities were limited to the parliament. An active campaign to discredit the state media has played a significant role. The criticism concerned both the political program of the CPC and its individual leaders.

The right-wing part of the party took a course towards social democracy, abandoning the fundamental foundations of Marxism-Leninism, which could not but lead to serious contradictions within the party in 2001 and to the exclusion of representatives of the left wing.

An important factor was the adoption by the CPC of tactics of cooperation with right-wing liberal parties and the creation of electoral and political alliances with them, which caused discontent among radical communists and alienated some potential supporters. Internal party conflicts, inability to adapt to new conditions, and lack of organization also contributed to the weakening of the CPC's position.

In 2004, a split occurred within the CPC, not without the participation of the authorities, which led to the formation of the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan (CPC). The KNPK took a more moderate position, rejecting a tough confrontation with the bourgeois government. This split significantly weakened the CCP, depriving it of some of its supporters and organizational potential.

The future of the CCP was a foregone conclusion. Since 2011, the party's activities have been repeatedly suspended under various pretexts. The publication of the Pravda of Kazakhstan party newspaper was banned, which dealt a serious blow to the CPC's information work and its relations with voters. The culmination was the court's decision in September 2015 to liquidate the CCP. The official reason was the allegedly insufficient number of party members (38,000 instead of the required 40,000). 

The CPC leadership regarded this decision as purely politically motivated, pointing to numerous violations of the liquidation procedure. This decision provoked protests from the opposition and human rights organizations, who accused the authorities of suppressing the political opposition. In fact, it was the liquidation of the last opposition party in the country.

It is noteworthy that neither the UPC-CPSU nor the Communist Party of the Russian Federation have made statements condemning this decision of Astana. In the extensive information of the UPC-CPSU on this topic, it was only suggested to the CPC and KNPC members to find a consensus in order to restore the ephemeral "unity". Moreover, in backstage conversations, the leaders of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation suggested that former CPC leader Serikbolsin Abdildin simply join the legal KNPK, but this was rejected by them.

Unlike the CPC, the KNPC continued its activities, adhering to a more loyal line towards the government. In 2012 and 2016, the party nominated its candidates for parliament, although it did not achieve significant results. This accommodating position is explained by the fact that it was originally created as an artificial clone party to split voters. Gradually, the KNPK finally abandoned its traditional communist symbols, and later its name, becoming simply the People's Party.

The question of the true freedom of political parties in Kazakhstan remains open, and the history of the CPC is a vivid example of the limitations faced by forces trying to revive the organization. In particular, the authorities refused to register our Socialist Movement of Kazakhstan seven times, and also refused to consider lawsuits in the courts.

The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (PKK), which was restored in 1992, vividly illustrates this difficult trajectory. Despite its unexpected success in the 2000 elections, where it received the most votes, the PKK constantly faced serious, though not always formalized, opposition from the authorities. 

The situation was complicated by the lack of transparency of electoral processes, the existence of administrative resources, and the general atmosphere of political instability typical of Kyrgyzstan at that time. Plus, the party leadership, instead of working with trade unions and mass popular movements that expressed dissatisfaction with market capitalist transformations and antisocial reforms, engaged only in convenient parliamentary activities, integrating into the political system as a constructive force.

As a result, during the 2010 coup d'etat, the party leadership actually supported President Bakiyev, who was overthrown as a result of mass protests due to a multiple increase in the cost of electricity. Such flirtation with one of the ruling class groups ended with the arrest of I.A. Masaliev, Chairman of the Central Committee of the PKK.

Although Masaliev was subsequently released for lack of evidence of a crime in March 2011, this event dealt a serious blow to the image and influence of the party. Moreover, the inability of the PKK to adapt to the new political realities, to develop a clear and consistent development strategy in the face of the growing class struggle and crisis phenomena of the capitalist system, as well as internal disagreements and the preponderance of supporters of "market socialism" led to the gradual loss of the party's political weight. 

To date, the PKK remains on the periphery of Kyrgyz political life, without having a significant impact on the political life of the country. Its ambiguous position on key issues of socio-economic development and the lack of concrete proposals to address the country's pressing problems have deprived the party of support from a significant part of the population.

Unlike Kyrgyzstan, the fate of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (KPT) developed according to a completely different scenario. Despite attempts to ban it in the fall of 1991, the CPT not only survived, but also played a significant role in stabilizing the situation in the country during the civil war. It is noteworthy that the Communist Party of Tajikistan offered armed resistance.

By joining the Popular Front, the KPT actively supported Emomali Rahmon, opposing the "democratic-Islamist opposition." This cooperation allowed the KPT to maintain its influence and legitimacy in the eyes of a significant part of the population. However, the formation of the "party of power" - the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) - In the second half of the 1990s, it gradually led to a weakening of the position of the KPT. 

The NDPT, controlling the state apparatus and having unlimited opportunities for resource mobilization, effectively displaced the CPT from the political space. The KPT's criticism of the Government on issues of economic policy, corruption and respect for human rights, expressed in a rather sharp form, caused sharp dissatisfaction with the authorities. In 2015, the KPT failed to overcome the established percentage barrier in the parliamentary elections, which finally consolidated its position as an insignificant political force. 

It should be pointed out here that a coup took place inside the KPT with the participation of the authorities, when in 2016, at the XXXII Congress of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, Shodi Shabdolov was not re-elected, and he was accused of strained relations with the leadership of Tajikistan and reducing the influence of the party. In reality, it was a conspiracy to finally subordinate the KPT to the ruling group led by President Rahmon.

It can be assumed that the suppression of Communist parties in these countries was dictated not only by ideological, but also by geopolitical considerations. Western countries, providing financial and political assistance to newly independent states, often insisted on "democratization," which precluded the revival of communist parties associated with the previous regime. 

Thus, the persecution of Communists was part of the West's overall strategy to create a pro-Western political landscape in Central Asia. In this strategy, the fight against communism has become a tool for achieving broader geopolitical goals. However, this approach ultimately did not strengthen the parliamentary forms of the dictatorship of capital, but only consolidated the bourgeois regimes under a new "democratic" flag. 

Unfortunately, the Communist parties were unable to put forward a revolutionary program of struggle against the restoration of capitalism and lead the labor movement and social protest movements. Their leadership was dominated and still is dominated by supporters of "market socialism", the "Chinese way", and support for their own producers. Their strategy was dominated by the idea of the need to join forces with "progressive" bourgeois-liberal forces to fight for common freedoms at the "democratic stage", after which the struggle for socialism would only follow.

Nevertheless, the legal or political liquidation of the Communist parties served the purpose of preventing the hypothetical potential consolidation of all protest forces in society around them, dissatisfied with the ongoing socio-economic and political course towards the further development of capitalism, in conditions of weakness and insolvency of bourgeois opposition organizations.

As a result of this purge of communist parties, bourgeois-nationalist dictatorships have only strengthened in the republics, usually led by former leaders of the Soviet Communist parties, but with a state ideology where anti-communism is their main core.

The restoration of capitalism turned into a real social catastrophe for the republics of Central Asia, when the process of deindustrialization and liquidation of many sectors of the economy took place. As a result of investments by Western companies, mining industries, as well as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy enterprises, remained mainly. 

The Governments of the republics everywhere pursued a policy of reducing allocations for the social security system and curtailed workers' rights, amending social and labor legislation, as well as restricting the freedom of trade union activity. But these phenomena manifested themselves most vividly and prominently in Kazakhstan, as it was there that the strongest class actions of labor collectives took place and where the struggle for trade unions unfolded.

The eight-month strike of oil workers in the Mangystau region in 2011 became a rubicon for the ruling class and the leadership of Kazakhstan, after which a radical reform of labor and trade union legislation took place. On June 27, 2014, three years after the shooting of striking workers in Zhanaozen, during which more than 70 strikers died, the law "On Trade Unions" was signed by the President of Kazakhstan, which deprived workers of the right to form their own independent trade unions. All such associations were subsequently liquidated by court decisions.

As a result, the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan, controlled by the authorities, remained in Kazakhstan, where former heads of regional administrations who had previously fought strikes, as well as two more formal organizations, were appointed heads. 

The Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan reported on the liquidation of more than 600 local, local and primary trade unions through the court, which did not comply with the new law "On Trade Unions". At the end of 2017, the last Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kazakhstan was liquidated, and four of its leaders were sentenced to various prison terms for allegedly inciting illegal strikes.

In addition, the rights of trade unions related to the initiation of labor disputes, the conclusion of collective agreements, the organization and participation in strikes have significantly narrowed.

By adopting this law, the Parliament of Kazakhstan violated even the Constitution of Kazakhstan (paragraph 1 of Article 1), which proclaims the Republic a democratic, secular, legal and social state, whose duty is to recognize, respect and protect human and civil rights and freedoms based on the principles of the rule of law and legal democracy; priority of international treaties over its laws (Article 4); the consolidation of fundamental human rights, including the right of everyone to freedom of association (paragraph 1 of article 23).

As a result, the law "On Trade Unions" contradicts Conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) 87, 98, and 135. And it does not comply with international standards in the field of human rights and freedom of association at work: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which grants everyone the right to form and join trade unions in order to protect their interests (paragraph 4 of article 23); The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which proclaims the right of every person to form and join trade unions of his choice for the exercise and protection of his economic and social interests, subject to the sole condition of compliance with the rules of the relevant organization.

In addition to the adoption of the law on Trade Unions, the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan adopted a new Criminal Code criminalizing trade union struggle on June 11, 2014. According to the new Criminal Code, the formation of unregistered trade unions, as well as participation in them, is already punishable by criminal liability and carries a prison sentence of up to three months in accordance with article 403. Organizing and participating in "illegal strikes" is also punishable by a three-year prison sentence. "Inciting social discord" remains a serious crime under article 174 and is punishable by up to 12 years in prison.

Article 398 of the new Criminal Code, which defines the methods of punishment for participation in an illegal assembly — the prescribed penalty is a fine, community service for up to 240 hours or arrest for up to 4 months, caused particular concern among Kazakhstani trade unions. Now any trade union meeting, demonstration or conference can fall into the category of "illegal". Any trade union or public association may also be closed for illegal interference in the activities of government agencies. Thus, new legal terminology and norms are being introduced that punish trade union activists.

On this occasion, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at the call of the Kazakh trade union Zhanart, issued a statement stating that "the WFTU notes that the state is now criminalizing trade union struggle, tightening labor laws, effectively prohibiting strikes and any actions in support of demands for higher wages, improved working conditions, and the revision of collective agreements, there is a decrease in the real role of even official trade unions and the imposition of bonded working conditions."

Despite the condemnation by global trade union centers and the ILO of the practice of discrimination against workers in their desire to create their own associations free from the control of authorities and employers, the government continued its policy in the interests of local and foreign companies and adopted a new Labor Code the following year in 2015, which deprived workers of the right to strike.

According to the new Labor Code, employees are forced to coordinate a strike through conciliation commissions for more than 40 days, and the procedure itself is so difficult that there has not been a single legal strike in Kazakhstan since 2014. But the norms of the Labor Code allowed employers to carry out mass dismissals of illegally striking workers and bring the leaders to criminal responsibility with their imprisonment, which is now actively applied in the country.

It should be noted that the anti-labor reforms of labor and trade union legislation initiated by Nursultan Nazarbayev as part of the implementation of the corporate concept of the "Society for Universal Labor", borrowed largely from Mussolini, were subsequently applied five years ago in Kyrgyzstan, and are also considered by the Government of Uzbekistan as a model.

This indicates that total decommunization, the prohibition of communist parties, the glorification of the Basmachi and members of the collaborationist formations who fought with weapons in their hands against the Soviet government eventually manifest themselves in the form of the elimination of all social and political gains of the workers, through their enslavement and a ban on the creation of their associations and strikes.

From the very beginning of the independence of the five former Soviet Central Asian republics, the processes of total decommunization began in them, which were expressed in the renaming of settlements, streets, and the demolition of monuments to revolutionaries and even heroes of the Great Patriotic War, as happened in Uzbekistan. Memorials to repressed anti-Soviet figures or victims of the Holodomor were erected on the site of the demolished monuments.

But the most disturbing thing here is that the Basmachi are now being politically and legally acquitted, that is, participants in the anti-Soviet movement in Central Asia, which distinguished itself by its particular brutality and acted first with the approval of Turkey, and then with the support of Britain in the 20-30s, and since 1941, and Nazi Germany from Afghanistan. Members of the Turkestan Legion of the Wehrmacht and the Eastern Muslim SS units are also being rehabilitated.

In Kyrgyzstan, on December 31, 2024, President Sadyrzhaparov signed such a law on the full rehabilitation of all victims of Soviet rule, including collaborators. It is noteworthy that the lobbyists of this bill were the Open Government, created with the participation of the American agency USAID, and the notorious Soros Foundation. In neighboring Uzbekistan, all prominent leaders of the Basmati movement were rehabilitated in 2022. In December 2023, 311,000 people, including bandits and criminals, were also rehabilitated in Kazakhstan.

But decommunization has reached its greatest proportions in Kazakhstan, where thousands of settlements and streets are being massively renamed, members of parliament have drafted a bill banning communist ideology and Soviet symbols, and the consciousness of young people is actively being transformed into a militant anti-Soviet spirit.

This is facilitated by various "documentary" and "feature" films such as "Oyan, Kazakh!" ("Wake up, Kazakh!"), funded from the state budget and designed to transform the consciousness of young people and present as the founders of modern statehood not Lenin and the leadership of Soviet Russia, but representatives of the local branch of the Cadet party "Alash". who created the so-called "Alash autonomy" with the support of the White Cossack chieftains and then became an integral part of the White Guard regime of Admiral Kolchak.

And these are not spontaneous works, but purposeful propaganda, since at the same time it was announced the release of a seven-volume edition of The History of Kazakhstan from Ancient Times to the Present Day, which completely rethinks the history of the Soviet Union. It completely changes the view of the era of Soviet socialist construction.

According to the new concept, as a result of "forced colonization", the ancestral lands were allegedly taken away, the institutions of biy (representatives of the judicial aristocracy) and batyrs were eliminated, and the power of the feudal elite in the person of the khans and sultans was abolished. And after the formation of the USSR and the Bolsheviks came to power, a period of continuous "holodomor" and conscious extermination began for the Kazakhs, and since the October Socialist Revolution itself.

At the same time, since Nazarbayev signed the decree "On renaming ideologically outdated names" in 2018, total decommunization in Kazakhstan has only accelerated, which resulted in the creation of the state commission for the final rehabilitation of victims of political repression in 1918 - 1953 by his decree back in November 2020.

Streets are being renamed, monuments are being erected, and books are being published in honor of the members of the Turkestan Legion of the Wehrmacht and its founder Mustafa Shoka (Choka). From them, as well as from the Alash-ordins, a bright image of heroes – fighters for national liberation from the Bolshevik dictatorship is being formed.

This active effort to decommunize and glorify opponents of the Soviet government is also a necessary and important part of its own "European integration", that is, the integration of the Kazakh ruling class into the Western system. Moreover, it is obvious to everyone that they want to follow the resolutions of the European Parliament on equalizing the USSR and Nazi Germany and condemning communism.

And such activities have important practical significance, namely the desire to cover up the current blatant social inequality, the transfer of oil, gas, copper, uranium, zinc, and rare earth metals to multinational corporations and local oligarchs. And also to show that the current statehood is not at all the result of Lenin's national policy, but the product of the work of Nazarbayev and Tokayev, who are supposedly the ideological successors of the bourgeois-nationalist "Alash Horde."

All these pseudo-historical myths serve one purpose – to further enslave the working people and strengthen the double oppression of both local and foreign capitalists. Moreover, the complete denial of the Soviet experience is aimed at discrediting social achievements and rights such as free education, healthcare, free housing and low utility tariffs, and a solidary pension system, which were taken away from working people and broad strata of the people, which are presented by propaganda as dependency.

And the current decommunization and glorification of the Basmachi and Nazi collaborators is now taking place in parallel with the new and final privatization of state assets, the transfer of the last deposits of strategic minerals to foreign corporations and the implementation of new anti-social reforms. In fact, present-day Kazakhstan has now returned to the same pre-revolutionary state, with the same management of foreign capital.

The Central Asian republics are on the verge of a serious socio-economic and political crisis caused not only by global upheavals in the global capitalist system and the intensification of geopolitical competition between the imperialist powers, but also by a number of internal factors that significantly worsen the situation. 

The external pressure exerted by the world's leading players seeking to expand their influence in the region is reinforced by internal contradictions. Economic instability caused by dependence on exports of raw materials and fluctuations in world prices leads to an increase in unemployment, especially among young people, which, in turn, generates social tension and contributes to the growth of protest sentiments. 

The problem is compounded by deep inequalities in the distribution of wealth, which leads to social stratification and increased class struggle. With limited opportunities for social mobility, growing poverty and unemployment are becoming a breeding ground for extremist religious as well as nationalist ideas. This situation is complemented by a complex ethnopolitical situation. Historically established ethnic and clan ties, often used by the political elite to their advantage, can lead to an escalation of interethnic conflicts.

Competition for limited resources – water, land, and energy – between the Central Asian States also significantly increases the risk of armed conflict. Transboundary rivers, such as the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, are a source of ongoing disputes, exacerbated by climate change and declining water resources. The struggle for control of energy resources, including gas and oil pipelines, can also provoke interstate conflicts.

External interference by leading Powers pursuing their geopolitical interests can significantly destabilize the region. The competition between Russia, China, the United States and other countries for influence in Central Asia creates an atmosphere of unpredictability and increases the risk of interference in the internal affairs of the region's states. Such interference can take various forms, from economic pressure and political blackmail to direct military intervention, which can lead to the complete collapse of States and the "Afghanization" of the region, that is, to the disintegration into conflicting territories controlled by various armed groups.

In this situation, new communist and workers' parties are needed, which must offer an alternative to the existing order and develop an effective revolutionary program of political struggle. The promotion of the idea of such a socialist alternative, focused on the maximum unity of the workers and the masses of all nationalities, is an important step along this path.

Our organization is making efforts to find and unite various youth groups, initiative groups of workers and social protest movements, to establish links with the remaining communist parties in the region in order to create such a basis for the emergence of similar new political formations in the future. After the events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan, when a general strike was held for the first time, including with political demands, we also launched work to legalize our activities through an attempt to register a Socialist Party.

At the same time, we supported the demands of the Kazakh workers themselves, put forward during the January rallies and the strike of 2022, namely:

- the abolition of anti-worker provisions of the Labor Code and the law "On Trade Unions", - freedom of meetings and strikes, the exercise of freedom of speech, - the creation of parties and trade unions, - the return of the Constitution of 1993, which declared workers' rights, - the release of all political prisoners, and - the rehabilitation of participants in the 2011 strike, who were shot and suppressed by troops. 

The most important thing at this stage is to help workers organize themselves into local initiative groups and committees, which would include both local residents and the unemployed in order to create a common front for the struggle for social and political rights. 

At the same time, we explain the slogan of nationalization itself, which is very popular among workers, that it can be really implemented with the participation of control only if the workers take power through their political party, which can change the balance of class forces and open the gates for real socialist transformations.

Therefore, the struggle against the dominance of foreign mining companies should be a struggle not just for nationalization, but against capitalism and for its overthrow and the establishment of a new social and political system without any intermediate phases and stages.