Social security, in the shape in which it came into being in 1945, was the outcome of a long struggle designed to make bosses pay for the risks inherent in their system. Life inside the capitalist system is full of uncertainties for workers. That is why workers have been struggling since the very inception of capitalism to keep an income when they are not able to work anymore because of unemployment, disease or old age. Capitalists do not pay what the worker produces up to its full value, wages are determined by what the worker needs in order to survive and take care of himself and his family. The reserves he is able to accumulate are thus minimal or nonexistent. Social security was born out of the vital necessity for workers to defend themselves.
After the Second World War, social security as we know it today came into being in Belgium with the decree-law of 28 December 1944. The innovation was the obligation for employers to pay a fixed contribution in order to guarantee universal insurance in matters of retirement pension, health and disability insurance, unemployment relief, family and holiday allowances for every salaried worker. Until then, bosses had been paying for their own workers only. A demand dating back to 1890 and to the general strike of 1936 had thus finally been fulfilled.
Belgian Social-Democrat leaders like to make believe that the social security system was a conquest of their party and its leader, Achille Van Acker. The truth is that it was the fear of socialist contamination that egged on employers to grant this reform.
In 1944, the Belgian Communist Party (PCB) and the USSR were enormously popular. The PCB had been the only pre-war party with no links to the new order to present itself as such to the population. The catholic and liberal parties had disappeared qua political parties. The socialist leader De Man had entered the service of the occupier and dissolved the POB as early as 1940.
As from the first months of the occupation, the communists organized strikes. In May 1941, the Party called for the constitution of the Front de l’Indépendance (the “Independence Front”), a wide unitary and popular movement of resistance to the enemy. Two thousand communists sacrificed their lives resisting fascism.
At the end of the war, sympathy for communism and the USSR was immense. In Belgium, the number of members of the Communist Party had gone up from 12,000 at the time of Liberation (in September 1944) to 103,000 in August 1945.
The bourgeoisie was in a hurry to take measures to root out a communist-inspired popular uprising. Robert Vandeputte had been president of the Banque d’Emission (which was working for the Germans) during the Second World War and would become Finance Minister a few decades later. According to him, “in 1944, business leaders were worried about revolutionary tendencies. Communism was enjoying a considerable amount of prestige. It is not without reason that they feared expropriations and nationalisations. (…)”. [5]
In order to sustain capitalism at such a critical moment, employers needed socialist personalities who would leap to defend reconstruction. The Social-Democrat leader Van Acker, who had been a trade-union leader, and had been very much involved in collaboration with the occupying force, side by side with Henri De Man, President of the Belgian Labour Party (POB), steered Belgian employers through the most difficult years of their history.
Enormous interests were at stake for Belgian employers who, for the most part, had worked for the occupying power. They had to make concessions, for they had a gun pointing at their head. They had to avoid “the worst”, i.e. a revolutionary mass movement supported by the armed partisans and inspired by the progress made by socialism in Eastern Europe.
Already during the war, the bourgeoisie had been preparing for this moment from a military point of view. According to Georges de Lovinfosse, a liaison agent between the government in exile in London and occupied Belgium: “The risk that the armed resistance, whose control we wanted to keep, could escape us was real … a widespread upheaval would have brought about a bloodbath in Belgium…. my mission consisted in…. keeping the insurrection under control at all times…The crucial problem was as follows: Who was going to assume civil and military power in the period between Liberation and the return of the Belgian authorities?” [6]
On the other hand, a strategy of social concessions had been agreed upon during clandestine negotiations during the war. As from 1942, some twenty members of the managerial staff of the Belgian Christian trade union CSC would gather at regular intervals under the leadership of their president, Auguste Cool. According to Cool, “The days following Liberation will be crucial. That will be the time when we will have to decide whether we want a new period of agitation, class struggle, mistrust between workers and employers, division inside the factories and businesses, or cooperation (…) We want this collaboration; that is why we have to do our utmost to avoid disturbances, strikes, conflicts.” [7] In secret discussions, bosses had made sure of the loyalty of the Socialist and Christian-Democrat negotiators.
Professor Deleeck, who had been a Christian-Democrat senator, wrote about this period: “In Belgium, the institutional development of dialogue economy and social security was drawn up during the war in secret discussions between employers and workers’ leaders belonging to all ideological tendencies. (…). The workers undertook to accept the authority of the bosses in the firms (i.e. to renounce the principle of nationalisation of enterprises) and to collaborate loyally in the intensification of national production.” [8] The following crucial sentence was inserted by common consent in the Social Pact of 1944: “The workers respect the legal authority of the company managers and consider themselves bound to carry out their work, and to remain faithful to their duty”. [9] A commentary published in a stock-market publication confirmed this: “This passage is a perfect illustration of what was aimed at by the promoters of this pact: the creation of a structure that could erect a barrier against the establishment of state control, as encouraged by mounting communism”. [10]
Thus, if the bourgeoisie’s fears were very real, they were partly unfounded. When the PCB (Belgian Communist Party) rightly united with the patriotic bourgeoisie during the war, it abandoned its autonomous programme at the same time. It stuck to respecting the programme of the Front de l’Indépendance (FI) (Independence Front), in which the bourgeoisie had had inserted “the respect of constitutional liberties” (Point 6 of the programme), i.e. upholding the bourgeois state, the bourgeois order. It did not try to raise the aspirations of the Resistance fighters further than that of “driving out the occupiers”. However, the people were not only fighting to get the enemy out, their struggle was also aimed at establishing a just and fraternal society, after so many years of horror. The only thing the PCB had in view for the post-war period was to glean a few crumbs of power through participation in the government. Shortly after Liberation, the Independence Front called for the restoration of the state, its institutions, its “constitutional liberties”. It recalled the pre-war Belgian government from London to rule the country, whereas this very government had gone to great lengths to protect Belgian fascists and imprison communists. The Independence Front programme, which had been approved by the PCB, even provided for the liquidation of the Resistance movement through its incorporation into the official Belgian army, under the pretext that the war was not yet over, whereas everybody knew that its end was near and inevitable. For this reason, the Resistance movement had to be disarmed.
Fear of the U.S.S.R., the power of the communist parties in certain European countries, their direct and indirect influence on trade-unionism weakened the resistance of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe to social progress. This appears clearly from a comparison between tax and social security deductions (in relation with GDP) in European countries and in the United States or Japan. Nationalisations were the order of the day as well. Soon after Liberation in France, for instance, de Gaulle had resorted to mass nationalisation: the Nord-Pas-de-Calais mines, Renault, Air France, the energy sector, the shipping sector, four big banks, savings banks and 34 insurance companies. This resulted, in the capitalist countries, in an increase in public expenses as compared to total national expenses.
Share of public expenditure in the gross national product of the United States (in %)
1913
|
1929
|
1940
|
1950
|
1955
|
1960
|
1965
|
1970
|
7.1%
|
8.1%
|
12.4%
|
24.6%
|
27.8%
|
28.1%
|
30.0%
|
33.2%
|
Share of public expenditure (social insurance included) in the net social product of Germany, later the Federal Republic of Germany. [11]
1913
|
1928
|
1950
|
1959
|
1961
|
1969
|
15.7%
|
27.6%
|
37.5%
|
39.5%
|
40.0%
|
42.5%
|
Right up to the eighties, West-German trade-union leaders, among them the almost legendary president of IG-Metall, Otto Brenner, knew from experience that “during negotiations with the bosses, an invisible but perceptible partner was always present at the table, the socialist GDR (German Democratic Republic- East Germany)”. [12]
A German trade-unionist wrote: “I was certainly no supporter of the GDR. But in those days, there was a certain pressure during negotiations with employers. In those days things had been achieved in the GDR: payment of wages when children were ill, lengthening of paid holidays, a free, paid day a month for women, rules concerning the protection of mothers and children, total protection against redundancy, payment of overtime, all this had an indirect impact on collective negotiations in the Federal Republic.” [13]