Lenin describes imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, which differs from free competition in the development of monopoly and finance capital, the economic importance of capital exports over goods exports, and the formation of international monopoly associations that divide the world among themselves (Lenin 1960).

Although capitalism reached its highest and final stage, imperialism, more than a hundred years ago, this does not mean that capitalism has not changed since then. While Lenin described a handful of imperialist states dividing the world among themselves and exploiting colonies and dependent countries, today we are dealing with an imperialist world system that emerged from the traditional capitalist states, the states that threw the yoke of colonialism supported by the socialist states and the counter-revolution and the restoration of capitalism in Soviet Union and the other countries of socialism, in 1989-1991. This fact is of strategic and tactical importance. Whereas democratic, anti-colonial upheaval was once the order of the day in dependent and colonial countries, today capitalism – with big businesses, monopolies, at its core – has been developed in almost all countries of the world, and socialist revolution is on the agenda.

In the early 2000s, amid the decline of the communist movement in Austria and the struggles over the orientation of the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ), Tibor Zenker, under the impression of the counterrevolution in the socialist states of Europe, raised and answered the question whether one can even speak of Austrian imperialism, in his book Stamokap heute (Stamokap Today) . Zenker argued at the time: ‘Austria belongs to the group of approximately 25-30 imperialist states that live primarily from the exploitation of backward countries and regions. (...) Of course, Austria is only a “small” imperialist country with a traditionally not very strong bourgeoisie.’ (Zenker 2005). Against the backdrop of this insight, the present text will examine the role of Austrian imperialism within the EU and the question of what impact the imperialist war in Ukraine has on the orientation of Austrian imperialism.

For this purpose, we will first examine the structure of Austrian monopolies and finance capital based on current data and developments, focusing on how they are structured and what role they play. The text then analyses in more detail how Austrian finance capital claims parts of the world – especially in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE region) – for itself and which capital exports take place. In this context, we will trace the historical reasons why this region is particularly relevant for Austrian capital and examine the role played by the EU's eastward expansion. Since the search for profits in this context has not been and is not limited to the EU, we will conclude by discussing Austrian monopolies and their work with Russian finance and monopoly capital. Finally, it is concluded that the monopoly and finance capital of the “small” imperialist country continues to be active in the struggle for influence and sales markets and has had to reorient itself in part due to increasing interimperialist contradictions.

Austria is home to a number of monopolies that are also significant on an international scale, although their importance varies between regions and countries. The following Austrian monopolies appear in the Forbes Global 2000 list [1] for 2025 (Murphy, Andrea. Schifrin, Matt 2025):

Further large Austrian monopolies not included in the Forbes list include Andritz AG, Porsche Holding, SPAR Austria, REWE International, Red Bull GmbH, ÖBB AG and Novomatic AG, as well as Porr, Magna/Steyr and KTM.

A closer look at these companies reveals two remarkable facts. Firstly, it is evident that a significant number of Austrian monopolies, particularly in the energy and transport sectors, are still (partly) owned by the Austrian state. Secondly, the financial sector accounts for a disproportionately large share compared to industry, to the extent that one could speak of an oversized financial sector.

This is illustrated as follows: the Austrian state holds 51 per cent of Verbund directly and indirectly via EVN AG, TIWAG and Wiener Stadtwerke GmbH, three energy companies that are partly or wholly owned by the state, and more than 30 per cent. The remaining 20 per cent is in free float. Verbund is active in 12 European countries and sees its main business area in South-Eastern Europe. In Spain, for example, Verbund operates through its subsidiary VERBUND Green Power Iberia (Verbund AG 2024).

ÖBB AG is still wholly owned by the state. With its subsidiary Rail Cargo Group (RCG), ÖBB has risen to become the number two in European rail logistics, with transports reaching as far as China. RCG operates in 14 countries with its own connections and subsidiaries (VerkehrsRundschau 2025) and has been represented by a subsidiary in Shanghai since 2023 (ÖBB 2022).

The Austrian state still holds 31.5 per cent of the OMV Group, making it the majority shareholder. 24.9 per cent is owned by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, with the remainder in free float. (OMV 2025a) The OMV Group is present in eight European countries with a network of 1,700 petrol stations supplied from its own refineries. OMV operates three refineries in European countries (Austria, Germany and Romania) and exploration, development and production projects for crude oil and natural gas in the NCESEE (North Central Europe, South East Europe) region. OMV also has locations in more than 120 countries in the chemicals sector (OMV 2025b).

The large share of the financial sector compared to industry is reflected in the fact that five of the nine Austrian monopolies on the Forbes list are banks or insurance companies. The two largest are Erste Bank Group and Raiffeisen International, followed by BAWAG Group. Overall, the Austrian financial sector is dominated by Austrian banks, which account for more than 50 per cent of the total balance sheet, with the three largest Austrian banks accounting for more than 50 per cent of the total balance sheet, according to the report ‘Facts about Austria and its banks – July 2025’ published by the Austrian National Bank. Over the last 10 years, the banking sector's share of Austrian GDP has consistently been above the euro area average, and Austrian banks represent 10 per cent of the banks in the euro area. They have an extensive network of subsidiary banks in Europe (35 subsidiary banks, 21 of which are in EU member states) (Austrian National Bank 2025b).

It is evident that Austria, which is small in terms of geography and population, has a number of significant monopolies that are highly competitive internationally and have been able to achieve dominance in certain regions and sectors. The CESEE region is of great importance to Austrian banks. For Raiffeisen International, business in Russia was also central until the start of the imperialist war in Ukraine.

The fact that the CESEE region is so important to Austrian monopoly capital is partly due to historical reasons. Parts of the region were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until 1918, and even after the end of the empire, Austrian influence remained and continued to have an effect. One of the reasons for the German national orientation of large parts of Austrian monopoly and finance capital after 1918 was the hope of restoring its own dominance in the region alongside German monopolies.

After 1945, Austrian neutrality provided the basis for maintaining business relations in the region, embedded in the Western capitalist bloc. Austria thus became a hub for trade between socialist and capitalist countries in Europe. After the counter-revolution of 1989-91, Austrian monopoly and finance capital skilfully exploited its existing relationships and contacts to profit from privatisations in the region and further expand its own position.

Despite its neutrality, Austria also skilfully contributed to the preparation of the NATO attack on Yugoslavia in the 1990s. From the outset, Alois Mock (Vice-Chancellor 1987-89, Foreign Minister 1987-1995) agitated for the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which earned him letters of protest from both the US and Soviet governments. In July 1991, the Austrian ambassador in Belgrade was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and accused of Austrian interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, support for separatism and tolerance of illegal arms deliveries. The Austrian government was also one of the first to unilaterally recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and was the first to call for the deployment of international troops in Yugoslavia. At the same time, Austria's accession to the EC was being prepared. All these activities were driven forward by Mock in particular (Ultsch 2011).

A few years later, following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the then Austrian Foreign Minister and later Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel took a logically consistent bourgeois position when calls for an end to NATO bombing became loud, stating that it should not be ‘the peace of Slobodan Milosevic and the cemeteries’. An end to the NATO war would only be possible if Belgrade accepted ‘an international security or military presence’ (Remme 1999).

In 1995, Austria finally joined the EU and became a member of the so-called NATO Partnership for Peace. This was a decisive step for Austrian monopoly capital towards further integration into the Euro-Atlantic bloc, which improved the country's position in Europe and opened up new business opportunities, even back then in the CESEE region. 

From 1991 onwards, the EU/EC had concluded a series of so-called Europe Agreements with Eastern and Central European states, which, among other things, provided for the establishment of free trade areas with these countries. Hungary and Poland were the first to join in 1991, followed by Bulgaria, Romania, Czechia and Slovakia (1993), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1995) and Slovenia (1996). The government under Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel described the EU's eastward expansion in 2002 as a core element of his government (editorial ORF.at 2019).

Since 1990, Austrian direct investment in the CESEE region has risen steadily. However, the first significant jump upwards came with Austria's accession to the EU in 1995 (1994: €2,369 million; 1996: €3,013 million). There was another jump with the start of accession negotiations with Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Estonia in 1997 (1997: 4,016 million euros) and again with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Slovak Republic and Romania in 1999 (1998: 4,236 million euros, 1999: €5,470 million). From then on, direct investment rose steadily and experienced another sharp increase with the EU enlargement in 2004 (2003: €16,293 million; 2005: €30,288 million). With €93,233 million in 2024, the CESEE region is the main destination for direct investment from Austria. Of the €214,346 million in direct investment in Europe, around 43 per cent goes to the CESEE region (Austrian National Bank 2025a). Direct investment refers to cross-border corporate investments with a share of at least 10 per cent of the voting capital, i.e. investment participation from Austria of at least 10 per cent of the voting capital abroad.

Under the title ‘Opportunities for Austria’, the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs states that Austria is strongly committed to the accession of all countries in the Western Balkans to the EU. The ministry emphasises that Austria is the largest investor in Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the second largest investor in Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Serbia. Austrian investments rank among the highest in all other countries in the region (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs).

It is therefore clear that the CESEE region is of extraordinary importance to Austrian monopolies. Austria's membership in the EU secures Austrian monopolies access to the region through agreements or the admission of the respective countries into the imperialist alliance.

The importance of the CESEE region for Austrian monopolies can also be clearly seen in the example of Austrian banks. Austrian banks have 35 subsidiary banks in 14 CESEE countries. The most important subsidiary banks are located in Czechia and Slovakia, accounting for around 54 per cent of all assets in the CESEE region held by Austrian subsidiary banks. Other important subsidiary banks in EU-CESEE countries are found, in order of size, in Romania, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia. Around 71 per cent of the total earnings of Austrian subsidiary banks in the CESEE region were generated by subsidiary banks in EU-CESEE countries (Austrian National Bank 2025b).

It can therefore be seen that the CESEE region is an important market for Austrian monopolies and finance capital, in which various policies have secured and expanded their historically established influence. This has led to high capital exports and the strategic establishment of subsidiaries.

Austrian monopolies were also well represented in business with Russia, and some still are. OMV, Raiffeisen International and Strabag were the leaders in Austria's business with Russia. Corporations such as OMV and VOEST-Alpine, which were formerly 100% state-owned, were able to seamlessly continue their good business relationships that already existed between the Soviet Union and Austria after 1991. VOEST counted the Soviet Union among its main supplier countries, while the Soviet Union and later Russia were the most important suppliers of natural gas and oil for OMV.

Strabag was one of the first Austrian monopolies to develop business activities in Russia. From 1992 onwards, Strabag was active in the construction sector in Russia and was involved in numerous projects ranging from office buildings and luxury real estate to infrastructure projects. Strabag's business in Russia was certainly also helped by the fact that around 24 per cent of the company is owned by the Russian MKAO ‘Rasperia Trading Limited’. A further 26.9 per cent is owned by the Haselsteiner family. The majority owners are Raiffeisenbank and the Austrian UNIQUA insurance company with 30.4 per cent. The remaining 16 per cent is in free float (Strabag 2025).

With the start of the imperialist war in Ukraine and the accompanying economic war by the US and the EU against Russia, Strabag froze Rasperia's shares and dismissed the corresponding member of the supervisory board. According to its own statements, it is complying with all prescribed sanctions and has withdrawn from business in Russia.

The situation is different in the case of Raiffeisen International, which is still active in Russia with a subsidiary. Until the start of the imperialist war in Ukraine, Russia was considered the cash cow. It was the country in the CESEE region where Raiffeisen International made the highest profits. As a result of the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU against Russia, the bank has no longer access to these profits. In 2021, the subsidiary bank in Russia contributed one third of Raiffeisen International's total profit of €1.4 billion. In the first quarter of 2022, just over a month after the start of the imperialist war in Ukraine, Raiffeisen International recorded a profit of €96 million in Russia and €23 million in Belarus. In Ukraine, however, Raiffeisen International recorded a loss of €41 million during the same period. In Ukraine, Raiffeisen International was also the market leader in the agricultural sector in 2022 (Leban 2022).

Raiffeisen International continues to operate in Russia to this day. Officially, an exit strategy from the region has been in the works for several years, and the customer base is being steadily reduced. As of 2024, the subsidiary bank in Russia had a balance sheet total of around €17 billion and ranked 16th in terms of loans granted, indicating its continued strong market position (Raiffeisen 2025b).

One of Raiffeisen International's biggest problems is that, due to sanctions, it cannot skim off the money it earns in Russia. Raiffeisen International is 61.17 per cent owned by the Austrian Raiffeisen Landesbanken, with the remainder in free float. This led to several problems last year, as Raiffeisenbank Niederösterreich/Wien is also a co-owner of Strabag. Raiffeisenbank therefore attempted to arrange a deal. As part of this, the shares of the Russian MKAO ‘Rasperia Trading Limited’, which is affected by the sanctions, were to be transferred to another Russian corporation, from which Raiffeisen International's subsidiary bank was to buy the shares in Strabag in order to finally transfer them to Austria. In this way, parts of the profits from the Russian business would flow back to Austria via Strabag shares and become skimmable. Conversely, funds would have been paid to MKAO Rasperia Trading Limited for its frozen Strabag shares. The deal was ultimately blocked by the EU, which refused to unfreeze the Strabag shares. As a result, a court ruling against the Russian subsidiary bank was upheld, requiring the bank to pay damages of €2 billion to MKAO Rasperia Trading Limited for the frozen dividends. Shares and dividends of the company, which is registered in Cyprus, were frozen because it is associated with Russian capitalist Oleg Deripaska, who has been sanctioned by the US since 2018 and the EU since 2022 (SOLID 2025).

In January 2023, Zelensky signed a decree that, among other things, classified Raiffeisen International's subsidiary bank in Russia as an accomplice to war and, consequently, provided for the seizure of assets, among other things. However, the sanctions imposed by Zelensky have no consequences for the business of Raiffeisen International's Ukrainian subsidiary (Der Standard 2023). As of 2024, its balance sheet totalled almost €5 billion, the bank ranked fourth in terms of loans granted and employed more than 5,000 people in Ukraine (Raiffeisen 2025a).

Direct investments also show that Austrian capital in Russia is not dead. Although they have grown less strongly than direct investments in other countries, they have nevertheless risen slightly when comparing 2021 (7 billion euros) to 2024 (7.4 billion euros). By comparison, Austrian direct investment in Germany rose from almost €38 billion to €45 billion, in the USA from around €15 billion to almost €24 billion, and in China from around €18 billion to around €26 billion (Austrian National Bank 2025a).

The good economic relations that parts of the Austrian monopoly bourgeoisie have cultivated with the Russian monopoly bourgeoisie are also evident when looking at the large number of former Austrian politicians who, after their political careers, took up positions on the executive and supervisory boards of Russian monopolies. Former Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) was a member of the supervisory board of the Russian oil company Lukoil until the beginning of March 2022, former Chancellor Christian Kern (SPÖ) left the supervisory board of the Russian state railway RZD on 24 February 2022, and former Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl (FPÖ) was on the supervisory board of Russian oil company Rosneft until the end of May 2022. Former Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) was also on the supervisory board of the think tank ‘DOC - Dialogue of Civilizations’, founded by Vladimir Yakunin, a Russian capitalist, from 2016 onwards. Kneissl now even lives in Russia.

When Putin visited Vienna in 2014 to sign a contract for a gas pipeline, he was also a guest at the Chamber of Commerce (WK). When WK President Leitl proudly pointed out that he was meeting Putin for the third time in his regularly extended role as WK President since 2001, Putin dryly remarked: ‘Dictatorship.’ After a short pause and some laughter, he added: ‘But a good dictatorship.’ It is therefore clear, both in terms of political personnel and economics, that Russia played and continues to play an important role for parts of the capital factions in Austria, and that the increasing interimperialist contradictions, which culminated in the war in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions, did not change this situation in any significant way.

Historical and current developments clearly show that Austria does indeed have its own vital monopoly and finance capital. It is highly competitive at regional level and, in some cases, beyond that. While military capabilities are limited, Austrian monopolies have a strength that might not be apparent at first glance given the size of the country and its limited military power. The dispute surrounding the Strabag shares owned by the Russian MKAO ‘Rasperia Trading Limited’ and the EU Commission's refusal to approve the purchase of the shares by the Russian subsidiary bank of Raiffeisen International and their subsequent transfer to the Austrian Raiffeisen Landesbanken also illustrate the limits of Austrian monopoly and finance capital.

Membership in the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace has enabled Austria's monopolies to assert their own interests more strongly through these imperialist alliances. They are among the beneficiaries of the EU's expansion in Eastern Europe, as well as the beneficiaries of NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia. At the same time, Austrian monopolies have also benefited from contacts in the former socialist countries beyond the borders of the EU, as business in Russia clearly shows. Economic relations with Russia were much stronger than those of the German monopolies, which were often in direct competition with the Russian monopolies.

The imperialist war in Ukraine and the accompanying economic war waged by the EU, NATO and the USA against Russia, in which Austria is also participating as an EU member, have strengthened the Austrian monopoly bourgeoisie's integration with the West. Business relations in Russia are now only possible to a limited extent and are hampered by sanctions. Austrian monopolies are either (temporarily) excluded from business in Russia, have withdrawn, or are trying to maintain business on a smaller scale without losing assets in Russia. Since business never takes a break, as we know, the Austrian monopoly bourgeoisie has also reoriented itself and is looking for other profitable investment opportunities within the EU and beyond. This demonstrates that the monopoly and finance capital of the “small” imperialist country continues to be active in the struggle for influence and sales markets and, in parts, is reorienting itself without breaking away, due to increasing integration into the Western imperialist alliance and the ever-growing interimperialist contradictions.

The Party of Labour of Austria is trying to further deepening its analysis of Austrian imperialism, in the light of class criteria and on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, and participates in the ideological political struggle. This is necessary for the enrichment of the strategic framework and developing the correct tactics under the Austrian conditions, in order to defend and strengthen an independent position of the communist and workers’ movement. Only from an independent standpoint, independent of this or that faction of Austrian monopoly and finance capital, can the struggle for the interests of the working class and the popular strata be strengthened, with the goal to overthrow capitalist exploitation and to build socialism.

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