The article you are about to read was written before the latest imperialist attack launched by the United States and Israel against Iran. The attack has led to significant changes in the Middle East, which constitutes the subject of this article. However, the resulting picture preserves the validity of the article’s main theses and, moreover, is consistent with the future projection it points toward.

Turkey’s Middle East strategy underwent a substantial transformation in 2024.

This was by no means the first time Turkey’s approach to the Middle East had shifted. In earlier decades, it was the “Iraq question” that defined the political agenda throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. The Turkish bourgeoisie and the state shaped their responses to this question on the basis of straightforward profit-and-loss calculations, while the “Kurdish question” assumed an increasingly regional character. These developments compelled a fundamental reassessment within Turkey’s ruling class regarding the country’s orientation toward the Middle East and, in doing so, triggered a series of internal crises within the state apparatus.

The next major turning point came in the early 2010s. By that time, Turkey had already taken on the task of “persuading” Syria to adapt to a transformation centered on US–Israeli interests. When anti-Assad protests erupted in Syria in March 2011, and the broader course of what came to be known as the “Arab Spring” signaled a new phase in the imperialist reconfiguration of the region, the earlier process of “persuasion”, in which Turkish bourgeoisie played a central role, was replaced by a policy aimed at achieving transformation through coercive means.

Taken together, all these developments seemed to form a scenario in which Turkey was positioned to play an active role in the region, a scenario that appeared, to one degree or another, to have been carefully engineered. From Turkey’s side, the driving force behind this construction was the imperial ambitions of Turkish capitalism and the fantasies of Neo-Ottomanism. From the US perspective, what was at stake was Turkey’s assignment to carry out this dirty task. In this reciprocal relationship, the question of which side encouraged the other gradually lost much of its significance. Yet, when one considers the process through which Turkey was encouraged, including the fact that the AKP was brought to power, it becomes clear that this was not a short-term plan.

In 2024, however, change unfolded rapidly and in a largely reactive manner. By the second half of the year, we began to see answers emerging to questions concerning the direction and intensity of this shift. But the truly decisive step was taken in the final days of October 2024. In a speech that marked a clear turning point, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, invited Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK and long described as the organizer of the latest Kurdish uprising, to address parliament. The fact that the same fascist leader who only months earlier had referred to Öcalan as the Imralı [1] Butcher now chose to describe him as a founding partner suggested that a genuinely strategic rupture lay behind this reversal.

At first glance, this rupture appeared to be connected to what has been called the "peace process”. Yet the line that links the Kurdish question to Turkey’s quest for regional dominance is hardly new. Turkey acted with a similar mentality in the 1990s, when it sought to extend its influence by negotiating with Kurdish tribal leaders in Iraq, and again in the 2010s, when it explored avenues of accommodation with the PKK. Ultimately, it is impossible for Turkey to establish itself in the region without making headway on a Kurdish question that stretches across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Conversely, it is equally impossible to develop any coherent approach to the “Kurdish question” without a broader strategy for the region as a whole.

It follows that caution is necessary when interpreting this strategic shift solely through the lens of the “Kurdish question”. Instead, the analysis must begin from a broader framework that includes the involvement of various imperialist powers and regional actors. Moreover, as we shall see, this framework cannot be reduced to a mere struggle for power. One of the central issues at stake is the economic restructuring of the Middle East.

But before turning to that, we should begin with another factor that draws our attention in the course change that unfolded throughout 2024.

The starting point of this entire story is October 7, 2023. At the moment when the Aksa Flood took place, considerable progress had already been made toward the normalization of Israel in the Middle East. Syria had been readmitted to the Arab League and was advancing its talks with the Gulf countries. Turkey, for its part, was enjoying the normalization of relations with Israel, having rid itself of the “anti-Israel” mask it had been obliged to wear following Erdoğan’s “one minute” performance at the Davos summit in 2009.

In that conjuncture, the unchanging parameter was Israel’s security and its role as the principal actor for the United States in the Middle East. At the same time, Iran, despite all fluctuations, remained the most influential regional actor in the Middle East. From the standpoint of US and British plans, Russia was still present in Syria, while China’s economic presence stood firmly in their way.

It follows that the silence broken on October 7, 2023 was hardly an innocent one. After all, “this is the Middle East.” Yet once Palestinian resistance disrupted the process of Israel’s normalization, it became inevitable that certain changes would occur in imperialism’s playbook. This time, Israel would be deployed as a battering ram in the effort to redesign the region. The point on which Israel, Britain, and at least a certain section of the of the bourgeoisie and the US state converged was the need to accelerate the process. Moreover, with a Russia already heavily pressured in Ukraine and a China persistently avoiding direct confrontation, acceleration appeared to be the only viable path forward.

This is what is meant by a window of opportunity. And judging by what was written in the Israeli press during the interval between the fall of Syria and the attack on Iran, it seemed almost certain that the opportunity would not be missed.

Of course, underlying this framework is the intervention of the United States in the imperialist system. The internal contradictions of this intervention, the debates within the United States itself, and Britain’s encouraging and task-assuming role at these junctures constitute a separate discussion. What is beyond doubt, however, is that the United States has been advancing with bold steps aimed at reshaping the system. These steps cannot be reduced to or explained by the personal character of Trump.

What is important, however, is that in imperialist intervention the “window of opportunity” factor has gained a significance greater than ever before. We have seen what kinds of consequences this can produce in the chain of successive “surprise” moves, including the fall of Syria, the military operation against Iran, and the intervention in Venezuela. Of course, none of this means that the United States possesses unlimited power. Moreover, it is entirely possible that these moves will generate results the United States will “regret,” that they will overstretch tensions within the imperialist system, or, most importantly, that they will trigger anti-imperialist and revolutionary struggles. For the moment, however, what we examine here is why this dynamic forced Turkey into the rapid transformation of 2024.

In the months linking 2023 to 2024, Israel acted like a battering ram and began to touch upon all the key points in the region. The weakening of Iran, the economic collapse of Syria, and the disarray of the Syrian state were seen as advantages that had to be exploited quickly, and the move whose principal actors were the Britain-United States-Israel trio was set in motion in Syria.

The Turkish state was both invited into and dragged along by this trio, took part and played an important role in the operation to bring about Syria’s collapse.

It was invited because Turkey is not merely Syria’s neighbor, but a state that over time has turned Syria into an “internal matter,” and one that has gained operational importance through its close ties with Islamist organizations on the ground and its logistical capabilities. More importantly, however, those who govern Turkey have been seeking their own Neo-Ottoman windows of opportunity. These cadres view the Republic of Turkey as a historical parenthesis and advocate a break from policies that “confine Turkey within itself.” The Turkey they imagine is a new and regional Ottoman formation, defined by Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab elements and held together by Islamism as its cement. In this sense, Turkey’s regional ambitions also provide a pathway to dismantle the Republic of Turkey [2] from an Islamist and sectarian standpoint. Turkish capitalism, which constitutes the real material basis of these policies, is already integrated into the region in ways that will not be easy to reverse, and the next objective of the Turkish bourgeoisie is certainly not “turning inward.”

We will return to the contradictions of Turkish capitalism and to the question of how substantial its imperial aspirations truly are. For now, what needs to be understood is that Turkey has been drawn into the game established by Britain, the United States, and Israel, but that it has also been more than willing to be drawn in.

At this stage, the greatest need of a Turkey that does not wish to remain outside the imperial game is speed. Yet Turkey lacks the preparation necessary to adapt to such a pace. Perhaps the meaning of Israel’s moves in the region has begun to be understood more clearly. In this context, it is evident that Turkey will find itself confronting Israel on multiple fronts. The foremost point of contention is the future of Syria. Nevertheless, by taking part in the collapse of Syria, Turkey itself removed the obstacle standing before Israel. Furthermore, Turkey is deprived of the most essential requirement for such speed: the Turkish state has allowed the “Kurdish question” to fester into a chronic condition, regionalized it, and turned it into a problem open to imperialist intervention.

All of this, paradoxically, necessitates pressing the accelerator even harder. The Kurdish question must be rapidly “resolved,” and to achieve this, the struggle against the Republic of Turkey must be intensified as the single enemy capable of uniting the actors of the “solution.” Yet at the same time, these developments place further strain on Turkey’s fault lines, play with the most sensitive nerves of Turkish society, and open wide the doors of intervention to other regional actors who wish to see Turkey weakened within the imperial game it has so eagerly entered. All of this feeds disagreements within the ruling bloc and, as a result, this chaotic environment locks the process in place. And to break this deadlock, even greater speed is required.

The Iran-Israel war that broke out in June 2025, in combination with the subsequent US attack, became another factor warning the Turkish state about the need for speed. While the government in Turkey believed it could fill the vacuum left by Iran and was making plans to entrench itself by closely monitoring developments, it was forced to recognize that events could rapidly spiral “out of control” and that its plans could be overturned. How this warning was perceived can be seen in Devlet Bahçeli’s statement that “Turkey is next.” Bahçeli now appears to be acting with urgency, fearing that the “peace process” may not “catch up.” This has been accompanied by pro-government journalists asking, “Why should we abandon the Kurds to Israel?”

For years, Turkey has sought ways to penetrate the region and has partially succeeded in doing so. Now it finds itself unable to step back and is trying to prevent these calculations from turning into a threat to its very existence. Turkey stands on the brink of “losing the bulgur at home while going to Dimyat for rice.” (“To lose the bird in the hand while chasing two in the bush”). The reason is clear: a Turkey that has failed to resolve its own “Kurdish question” has limited capacity to develop a strategy in the Middle East. Conversely, since the “Kurdish question” has irreversibly become a regional issue, it is impossible for Turkey to resolve its own problem without taking initiative in the region. A process left to unfold on its own, in this form, has no chance of survival.

One of the most fundamental developments that will shape Turkey’s coming period, and perhaps its fate, will be the direction in which this deadlock evolves.

So why is this deadlock confronting us with such weight precisely now?

The founding of the Republic of Turkey was the product of the revolutionary leap that took place between 1919 and 1923. This leap was part of the broader wave of bourgeois revolutions under the conditions created by the impact of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917. A series of elements that can be described as the “founding codes” of the Republic of Turkey emerged from the lessons drawn from this period. One of these lessons was the need to avoid any course of action that could lead to the questioning of Turkey’s borders.

The experiences of the First World War played a decisive role in shaping this outlook, which later crystallized into the principle of “Peace at home, peace in the world.” This was true in two respects. First, almost all of the cadres who founded the Republic of Turkey had developed a certain awareness regarding the plans of the major imperialist powers. This had been a necessary condition for keeping the Ottoman Empire intact. Second, although the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the war may have appeared inevitable, the timing and manner of that entry served as an important indication of how the Empire had been dragged into the conflict. When this experience was combined with the bitter memories of tensions between German generals and Turkish officers in the field and at the front, it also led to a growing awareness of the imperial ambitions of the cadres who had pushed the Ottoman state into the war. These lessons may initially have amounted to a foreign policy outlook carried by only a few individuals, but as the new order consolidated, they gradually turned into official state policy.

In this context, the cooperation established with the Bolsheviks during the War of Independence later evolved into a policy of preserving friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

What was crucial here was the following: the liberation movement in Anatolia and the Bolsheviks had prevented the imperialist powers, above all British imperialism, from seizing the region and reshaping it as they wished. The borders of Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Russia were closed off to the British, and the ability of the imperialist powers to redraw the world map at will was effectively blocked.

The purpose of the imperialist First World War was to impose a new shape on the world map. One of the reasons we describe the war as an “imperialist war of partition” lies precisely in this project of “imperialist cartography.” When the gains achieved by Moscow and Ankara throughout 1922 thwarted the plans of the imperialist powers, the world map and national borders ceased to be things that could be easily manipulated. By the time 1922 came to an end, Russia would be transformed into the Soviet Union, and the Ankara Government into the Republic of Turkey.

The Second World War offered a new opportunity for the imperialist powers. Allowing the Hitlerites to gain strength and turning a blind eye to Nazi Germany’s redrawing of borders reflected, on the one hand, the desire for revenge born of anticommunism in the imperialist centers, while at the same time providing an opportunity to revive plans that had been blocked after the First World War. The territories of the three empires dismantled at the beginning of the twentieth century would once again become objects of contention. All of this would remind the imperialists that the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey were, in historical terms, “unwanted products.”

As is well known, the Second World War, through the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the anti-fascist victory of the peoples, did more than simply frustrate the ambitions of the imperialist powers. It also imposed a different shape on the world map. The result was that maps and borders would remain largely untouchable for a long period. Yet the collapse of the Soviet Union would revive the core memory of the imperialists. What unfolded in the 1990s in Yugoslavia, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq, signaled that the notion of the “inviolability of borders” was coming to an end. As socialism’s legacy came under assault, it became evident that a new global order was taking shape—one characterized by the unrestricted mobility of capital beyond the constraints of nation-state borders.

Turkey adapted well to the world of 1945. Friendship with the Soviet Union was abandoned, the country became part of NATO, and Turkey’s ruling class pursued the flow of financial resources coming from the United States. All of this offered Turkey’s state managers the possibility of presenting Turkey as a country standing on the front lines of the struggle against communism, a form of valuation in the eyes of the imperialist system. The content of Turkey’s “peace at home, peace in the world” policy gradually began to erode. The decision to send troops on the side of the United States to the imperialist intervention in Korea demonstrated how quickly this policy could be discarded when necessary.

Nevertheless, the existence of the Soviet Union set limits not only for the world as a whole but also for Turkey’s ruling class. Moreover, the trauma of the 1920s, the knowledge that the Republic of Turkey was an unwanted and reluctantly tolerated country in the eyes of the imperialists, remained vivid in the memory of the governing cadres. Despite the massive anticommunist buildup, the capitalist class of Turkey was not yet in a position to break out of the realm of “timidity.” Islamism and Ottomanism, two of the most important components of that anticommunist mobilization, experienced a certain revival, yet this revival lacked the conditions necessary to acquire a function beyond anticommunism and to become the basis of a new state strategy.

We can point to two major sources of power that eventually provided Neo-Ottomanism with those conditions. First, Turkish capital had achieved considerable growth by the 1990s and had begun to establish serious connections with international capital. This situation imposed on the Turkish state the necessity of opening up new areas of profit for the capitalist class, both at home and beyond Turkey’s borders. Second, once the Soviet Union disappeared, the conditions that had allowed Turkey to “sell” its status as an “important country” to the Atlantic camp also vanished. This forced the Turkish state to abandon its old policy of “turning inward.”

Thus Neo-Ottomanism, emerging precisely from these conditions and gaining strength on the foundations of the counterrevolutionary process of the 12th of September 1980, the fascist military coup, advanced toward becoming the sole policy of the Turkish state. The aim was to transform Turkey into a regional power and, in the words of today’s ruling cadres, to “awaken it from a century-long sleep.” This did not necessarily mean reoccupying the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. Yet without turning Ottoman history, its sphere of rule, and its sociological structure into contemporary instruments, it was impossible to pursue an imperial vision. For this reason, casting an eye on the borders of neighboring countries became a rule of the game. The most effective way to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries was to transform those countries into internal affairs of one’s own. As Turkey entered the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East with its military and its capital, and as it received migration from these regions, progress began to be made in the project of Ottomanizing Turkey.

This is the kind of historical weight that lay behind Turkey’s 2024 impasse.

At this point, it is also necessary to clarify the relationship that Neo-Ottomanism has with the Kurdish question and with Israel.

One of the first major problems faced by the newly founded Republic was the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925. This uprising, which went down in history as the “first Kurdish uprising,” was most dangerous because of its Islamist, reactionary, and anti-Republican character, and because it was able to gain strength in a short time. There was no need to consult documents to understand that British imperialism stood behind the rebellion. The 1924-1925 period was one in which the Mosul question had become deadlocked between Turkey and Britain. Turkey had the support of the Soviet Union and was preparing itself for a confrontation with Britain. After the rebellion, Mosul was ceded to Britain with the Ankara Agreement signed in 1926, and another important lesson was drawn from the “Mosul question.” As long as Turkey failed to eliminate its own internal fault lines, it would remain open to imperialist intervention.

From our point of view, this meant that the liquidation of feudal relations was an absolute necessity. The approach of the Comintern and of the Communist Party of Turkey was shaped along these lines. As long as Turkey refrained from dismantling the tribal and religious order, failed to push forward land reform, and continued to treat Kurdish language and culture with prohibitions, it was inevitable that this would turn into a “problem” and gradually become a structural fault line. Yet not only were these steps never taken, but the Turkish state and capitalist class came to view this issue as an opportunity to divide the working class, to create an army of cheap labor, and to extract political and economic rent from the problem. As a result, the pushing of the Kurdish question into a state of permanent irresolution opened the door to imperialist intervention in Turkey. The collapse of the Soviet Union multiplied the complexity of this picture. Not only imperialist powers, but also regional actors began to establish links with the PKK and to use this issue as a lever for reshaping Turkey and the region.

Israel’s connections with Kurdish tribes go back much further. Mossad was in contact with Iraqi Kurds at least as early as 1958 and cooperated with tribal leaders there, above all Barzani and Talabani. The year 1958 was a critical turning point in every respect. The monarchy had been overthrown in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan were in crisis, and Arab unity was gaining momentum. From the perspective of “Israel’s security,” the stateless Kurds possessed strategic importance as a means of breaking the Arab ring. From the standpoint of the United States, Soviet influence in the Middle East was on the rise. These developments pushed Washington to seek “proxies” in the region and brought Israel to the forefront. The secret Turkey-Israel-Iran alliance of 1958 was, for example, a product of these balances.

In short, the Kurdish issue has long been important within the framework of Israel’s “periphery strategy.” It was a variable that played a role in creating the “balance of powers” that was considered the only viable path to Israel’s security in a Middle East where no single regional actor could be allowed to dominate. The PKK, on the other hand, by virtue of its founding and its program, was at odds with Barzani and maintained, at best, a certain distance from Israel. Yet the collapse of the Soviet Union was the development that injected entirely new content into all these tensions. In a conjuncture in which the PKK gradually freed itself from the weight of socialism and evolved into its current nationalist form, and given the organization’s growing influence in Syria, Israel increasingly stood out as the most effective actor capable of establishing a foothold within the Kurdish question. Moreover, statements coming from within the PKK, including those made personally by Abdullah Öcalan, made it clear that Turkey was not the PKK’s only possible alternative.

In other words, while there was a degree of reality behind Turkey’s strategy of “not leaving the Kurds to Israel,” the entire history of the Kurdish question pointed in the opposite direction. The Kurds were remembered only when the regional interests of Turkish capitalism resurfaced. Without the Kurds, Neo-Ottomanism was impossible.

But could Neo-Ottomanism stand on its own? To put it differently, where did Neo-Ottomanism fit within the imperialist system?

Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush Senior met in December 1988 on New York’s “Governors Island.” The Soviet Union had begun to dissolve from above, while the United States was already planning how to reshape the post-Soviet world. Gorbachev’s words about “friendship” caressed the core memories etched into the minds of the imperialists from 1922 and 1944.

Yet there was an important difference. The United States had inherited, or in fact created, an imperialist system very different from the one Britain, and France had operated at the beginning of the twentieth century. This system had been fundamentally shaped by the task of confronting the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States, which had already moved to the forefront economically, was elevated far beyond the position of being merely one among equals and assumed the role of guardian of the imperialist system and of the world bourgeoisie as a whole. The guardian United States would now reveal its face as a “rule maker.” In a world without the Soviet Union, the Middle East was one of the first places where the drive to eliminate the “remnants of the Soviet era” and to implement the globalization required by the capitalist system made itself felt. What we are referring to is the continuation of what had been carried out in Yugoslavia. Once the US state resolved its internal strategic debate, the question of “Afghanistan first or Iraq first,” it became clear that the engineering of September 11, 2001 would turn first toward Afghanistan and then toward Iraq. In reality, however, the plan from the very beginning had been the occupation of Iraq.

Iraq was important for two reasons. First, it represented the most significant threat to Israel’s security. Second, and equally important, Iraq, Iran, and Libya were located at a critical junction in global oil and energy supplies. “Pax Americana” was impossible without establishing dominance over these resources. The central importance of oil and energy could also be observed in the political debates taking place in the United States at the time. We know that oil continued to be one of the most fundamental economic instruments of the post–Second World War order and even increased in importance. Two key figures in the cabinet of George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice and Dick Cheney, were drawn directly from the oil business. The most important financiers of Bush himself were the monopolies of the oil sector.

At the same time, the economic crisis of 2008 would transform the world economy and add new and significant factors to US policy in the Middle East. China’s economic growth played an important role in overcoming the 2008 crisis. Yet the issue went far beyond the question of how a rising China would be integrated into a world economy dominated by the United States. US power began to be questioned and, at times, openly tested. Russia and China demonstrated an ability to move into the spaces left vacant by the United States and other countries within the imperialist hierarchy. China not only established itself economically in post-Saddam Iraq, but also built significant economic ties with the Gulf countries and even with Israel. These ties were not limited to oil and energy. As a new economic power, China, under conditions of fierce capitalist competition, expanded into every area the United States failed to control through infrastructure investments, financial relations, and supply chains. The Belt and Road Initiative began to turn into a strategic threat for the United States. Russia and Iran, for their part, refused to allow the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria and established a military presence in the region. Throughout the decade stretching from the 2010s to the 2020s, debates over US foreign policy were marked by strategic disagreements on how Russia and China should be confronted.

On the other hand, this same decade pushed those governing Turkey, as in many other countries, to make use of the relative room for maneuver that had opened up. In the harsh struggles of the international arena, the most powerful instrument of every capitalist is the state. The Turkish state, as the protector and promoter of Turkish capitalism, did not limit itself to consolidating its position in its own region. Even under conditions in which it confronted Russia in Syria, it was able to take advantage of the bargaining space that emerged between the United States and Russia. When Ali Koç, a member of the Koç family, one of the most powerful elements of Turkey’s capitalist class, and at the time president of Fenerbahçe Sports Club, declared after Fenerbahçe fans chanted “Putin” during a 2022 match against Dynamo Kiev that “we will not apologize to Ukraine,” this was more than a symbolic gesture. Turkish capital was in fact making enormous profits from the conditions created by the imperialist war in Ukraine. Erdoğan managed to preserve his power in part thanks to his ability to exploit this space. From the founding of the AKP in 2001 onward, they had learned the lesson that “whoever convinces the United States and big capital remains in power.” By this point Turkish capitalism had entered into serious economic relations with Russia. This international conjuncture also offered an opportunity to demonstrate “Turkey’s value.” Moreover, when Erdoğan pushed this freedom of maneuver too far and turned into a “liability” for the United States in 2016, it was Russia that saved him from being overthrown in a coup.

Yet this room for maneuver narrowed considerably in 2024. The United States was forcing Turkey to “take sides,” but the issue was not simply American banditry. The fall of Syria laid bare Russia’s weakness in Ukraine and left those who claimed to govern Turkey facing the question of what “Turkey’s value” was really worth on the Middle Eastern market. Turkey had already been trying for some time to repair its relations with the Atlantic camp with the help of Britain. This was accompanied by the need for an inflow of resources demanded by Turkish capitalism. From the fall of Syria to the plans carried out in the Caucasus with Azerbaijan and Armenia to “drive Russia out,” Turkey’s cooperation with the British was no secret. The influence of the United States, Britain, and Israel was becoming increasingly evident in Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey was a potential key actor in energy, trade, cheap labor, and logistics corridors stretching from India to the Caucasus and from Iran to Lebanon, Israel, and the Mediterranean. It was becoming clear that the US plan to economically revitalize the Middle East while securing Israel’s safety and turning the region into a cheap labor haven would become the new anchor of Turkish capitalism.

If Neo-Ottomanism is to have a future, it is evident that it will take shape under the American umbrella. The consequence of this is a return by Turkey to a wave of pro-Americanism similar to that of the early 2000s. The fact that the NATO summit is scheduled to be held in Turkey in 2026 is an important indicator. When the NATO summit was held in Turkey in 2004, George W. Bush spoke with the Bosphorus behind him, and Turkey’s entire ruling class and major capitalist families gathered to listen. NATO and the American presence functioned as a process of compensation for the parliamentary motion rejected on March 1, 2003 due to public pressure and powerful protests against the occupation of Iraq. Even before the AKP came to power, the United States had been negotiating “Iraq deals” with Turkey. Turkey’s resistance was one of the major factors that brought down the government preceding the AKP. The AKP therefore came to power, but the desired results were not obtained. Bush’s Istanbul show signaled that the forces within the Turkish state associated with March 1 would be purged and that the state itself would be transformed. Ultimately, as the United States made use of Turkish airspace, logistical support, and cooperation through İncirlik, Neo-Ottomanism found a new lease on life on the basis of this collaboration. It was this cooperation that positioned Turkey in the Middle East. After having failed in the 1990s to gain a foothold in Azerbaijan and Iraq, Neo-Ottomanism was now experiencing its second birth.

Today the political economy of the Middle East rests on an architecture with The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) on one side and, on the other, the Abraham Accords securing Israel politically. This architecture aims to expel China and Russia from the region while allowing Europe to receive a share of the economic revival to be orchestrated under US leadership. Yet the plan contains numerous problems, including how Iran will be brought under control, to what extent the conflicting interests among the Gulf countries can be restrained, and how energy and trade routes from the Mediterranean to Europe will be divided. In a geography with so many actors and a high probability of clashing interests, a very strong US influence is truly necessary for “things to work” in the interests of US monopolies.

Turkey wants to be part of this plan. We have already noted that it has little alternative. There is no longer a Turkish capitalism capable of behaving modestly or retreating into its shell. On the contrary, Turkey seeks to establish dominance in the region. This is what we call Neo-Ottomanism. The PKK problem stands precisely as the obstacle blocking the path to this objective. The Turkish state is attempting to transform this obstacle into an advantage. Yet it is entirely possible that this entire picture will be shaken by crises and ruptures. Moreover, it is impossible for imperialist interventions and capitalism to bring peace and stability to the Middle East or, for that matter, to any part of the world. It is also a reality that none of the countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean would easily accept a strengthened Turkey. Therefore, the possibility that this complex picture could loosen Turkey’s grip and that Neo-Ottomanism might collapse at the very moment it appears to be rising is far from remote.

These possibilities clearly offer no bright future for the exploited and oppressed peoples of the region. Yet it should not be forgotten that the moments when imperial projects collapse are also moments pregnant with powerful revolutionary advances.

Turkey’s position of being caught in between is a circumstance that must be prepared for and evaluated as an opportunity.